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Prepared for [redacted] 215
Comments on draft paper of Defense Department,

"Nuclear Warfare Versus Economic Defense,

11 March 1957" - (Odd Title!)

- I. The recommendation on page 6 appears reasonable (with certain reservations indicated below) in view of the latest NSC decision (NSC 5704/1 of 6 March 1956, para. 16 Courses of Action) which reads "Seek a close association with NATO and other security alliances and, where feasible, to obtain their consideration and advice on appropriate economic security problems."

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[redacted] the subject has been discussed sufficiently often in the past to indicate that this criterion may be proposed in COCOM in the not too distant future. In the absence of any clear-cut understanding of the significance of such a proposal, it would seem advantageous to have an assessment of it made by competent authorities. It would seem preferable, however, to initiate such discussions in bilaterals between the UK and the U.S., attended by both military and civilian technicians. At the present time there is no recognized connection or coordination between NATO and COCOM. In fact, any allegation of such a relationship has, in the past, been considered odious by EC's for varying reasons. As a result it is conceivable that the consideration of the nuclear warfare criterion "by NATO for the benefit of all COCOM/CHINCOM countries" might be the easiest way to secure its rejection in the COCOM forum.

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II. [redacted]

The U.S. views on strategy appear very hazy and unconvincing. A more authoritative statement should be readily available. On page 3 the key statement (which is unsubstantiated) appears to be that "Strategy is a product of evolution - not of revolution." The contrary might be proved, but either way you look at it, what difference does it make? The comments on page 5, particularly the development of the statement that "General war will remain a possibility," do have a logical place in the paper although the argumentation could be improved.

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III The last paragraph of the Discussion on page 8 seems completely futile. In view of the acknowledged rejection in 1954 of the dual-use argument (page 3) except when a preponderant military use is involved, the obvious dual-use of nuclear energy for peace time and wartime purposes raises this issue again. The rejection by the USSR of even aerial inspection of military installations, except in a very restricted fashion, renders slightly ridiculous the suggestion of inspection teams of COCOM members to follow up the end-uses of commodities shipped by the West to the Bloc under the terms of trade agreements, past and future.

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20 March 1957